Gonzaga 2020-21 Offensive Breakdown

Why are these guys so good?

***All stats of March 10, 2021***

The Gonzaga Bulldogs enter the NCAA Tournament undefeated for the first time in program history. They lead the nation in points per game and have the top adjusted offensive efficiency in the nation. They aren’t just beating teams – they are obliterating them, with 23 straight double-digit victories.

The last team to finish with the top offensive efficiency AND be top 10 in tempo was 2009 North Carolina, who blasted every opponent by double digits in the NCAA Tournament on their way to a championship. Gonzaga, who is fourth in tempo, may add their name to that list.

In an era of basketball where the three-point shot is so valued, Gonzaga is doing all this without any heavy reliance on it. They enter the tournament scoring just 23.8 percent of their points from beyond the arc, which is 322nd out of 345 teams that played Division 1 college basketball this season. Prior to the WCC Tournament, Corey Kispert was the only player on the roster averaging more than one make per game.

What Gonzaga is doing is putting up historic numbers inside the arc. They are shooting 63.9 percent from two-point range, which would be the best clip in at least 25 years (1999 Samford and 2016 Belmont finished at 62.4%).

Since the 2011-12 season, 112 teams have shot at least 45 percent of their shot attempts at the rim in a given season. The highest clip of any of those teams was Ja Morant’s Murray State team in 2019, who shot 65.6 percent at the rim on their attempts. Gonzaga attempts 48.9 percent of all their shots at the rim this year, and they are connecting on a whopping 73.3 percent of them. There have been five games this season where a team scored 70+ points in the paint. Gonzaga has three of the five. In short, what they do is incredibly sustainable and feels almost impervious to poor scoring nights.

If you saw those numbers in a vacuum, you would probably guess this team has multiple dominant big men and they just pound the ball inside. Not the case with this Gonzaga team. They do this with an elite transition game, elite ball screen reads, and a roster full of high IQ basketball players. They play a majority of their time with four perimeter players on the court. Their coaching staff puts them in a position to capitalize on advantages based on the actions they run.

The goal of this offensive breakdown is to highlight how and why Gonzaga is so successful this season. What are they looking for in transition? How do they create advantages in the half court? What are they reading in ball screens? How does their off-ball movement create success?  Hopefully all of those questions can be answered in both word and video form.

First and foremost is the transition game.  This is the most transition-heavy Gonzaga team of all time. They are shooting a program record 35.0 percent of all their shots attempts in transition (first 10 seconds of shot clock). Of those shots, 51.9 percent come at the rim, where of course they are shooting at an absurd 77.1 percent. No better example of the growth in Gonzaga’s transition game than Corey Kispert himself.

Last season in transition: 20-for-40 at the rim, 28-for-67 from deep

This season in transition: 41-for-47 at the rim, 31-for-69 from deep (was 30-for-62 prior to WCC Tourney)

In general, Gonzaga’s attack features two perimeter players sprinting the sidelines, one ball handler attacking the middle of the floor, one forward rim running, and a wing trailing. Of course, that can vary, especially the rim runner. Plenty of times, Drew Timme or Anton Watson end up becoming a trailer instead, and if nothing works out, they get into their secondary transition and ball screen actions right away.

The first thing they want to do if they can is kick the ball ahead and beat the defense down the court before they know what hit them. The easiest way to score is to get behind the defense in transition and convert layups. Gonzaga does it better than anyone.

Six of Gonzaga’s seven rotation players have effective field goal percentages above 60 percent in transition, the lone exception being Jalen Suggs. The consensus top five NBA draft pick has just a 58.3% eFG in transition.

If they don’t get a throw ahead to a wing, they’re looking for Drew Timme and Anton Watson rim running. There are a lot of lumbering big men who don’t enjoy sprinting up and down the court for 40 minutes. Timme and Watson aren’t those types of players. They thrive in the transition game.

Let’s stick with the post guys because they work their tails off to get easy baskets. Sometimes the actual rim run pass isn’t there, but Timme, Watson, and Oumar Ballo get deep enough position to warrant early post touches. That trio is shooting 77 percent at the rim in transition because of the early work they put in, especially Timme. If you want to know where he earns his stripes, it’s right here. Just watch him work for the final three minutes of this video. You can almost guarantee 10 points a game minimum on rim runs and early post ups.

You may notice as you watch these videos, and may have already noticed while watching them during the year, that Gonzaga scores a remarkable amount after an opponent’s made basket. You would be correct, and the numbers are wild.

8.4 percent of Gonzaga’s initial field goal attempts come within the first 10 seconds following an opponent’s made shot. They have an absurd 72.1 percent eFG% on those shots, where, hypothetically, the defense has more of a chance to be set. To put that in perspective: Alabama, who is the only team the nation with a quicker possession length than Gonzaga, shoots 9.1 percent of their initial attempts in the first 10 seconds after an opponent’s made basket. They only have a 49.3 percent eFG%.

If that isn’t super clear: Gonzaga shoots in the first 10 seconds of the shot clock following a made basket way more than the average team. And they are exponentially more efficient while doing so. The efficiency of the Bulldogs’ transition attack, at the volume they do it, is not normal whatsoever.

If all those quick hitters don’t work, the next option is to just attack the rim, whether it’s going coast-to-coast yourself or finding a teammate to dump it off to. Gonzaga wants to relentlessly get to the rim whenever they can.

The thing Gonzaga does when attacking in transition, and Jalen Suggs does this probably better than anyone, is they attack the middle of the floor. They may start from the wing, but the goal is to attack middle - to both collapse and flatten the defense. When the defense collapses to the ball handler, it allows for those guards who are already sprinting to the corner, to get behind the defense for baseline basket cuts.

The other reason to attack middle is to flatten the defense. Flattening the defense basically means to push all of them lower and off the three-point line, creating enough space for trail threes. And anyone who has watched Gonzaga this season knows they might have the best trail three-point shooter in the country in Corey Kispert. The first part of this video is Gonzaga finding everyone else for open transition threes. The second part is finding Kispert in transition. This thing had to be shortened to five minutes just so we can move on. It could easily be 10 minutes long. Despite his cold spell in the WCC Tournament, Kispert is still one of the deadliest shooters in the country, especially from the left wing in transition.

Gonzaga shoots 39.1 percent from deep in transition this season, their best mark since 2015. It’s just the second time in the last 10 seasons where they shot better from deep in transition than they did in non-transition (2014 was the other).

Of course, not every basket is going to come that easy. At some point they have to move into their offensive actions. That starts with their secondary transition pick-and-rolls. If Timme is bringing the ball up or trailing the play, they will go straight into a ball screen or DHO (dribble hand-off). With defenses not totally set yet, they can usually get some quick buckets.

And with that, we get to the ball screen portion of the playbook. Obviously, ball screens make up the heavy majority of Gonzaga’s offense. Even most of their set plays are just different ways to get into ball screens and create advantages.

You hear the term “Continuity Ball Screen” around the Gonzaga program. This year’s offense is very heavy on continuity, in that if an action gets defended very well, the ball will reverse to the other side and another action will begin. That’s slightly different than running “Continuity Ball Screen”, which is a set motion offense and something they’ve perfected the last several years, most notably with the 2017 and 2019 teams. They don’t run a ton of the traditional version of that this season, at least not as much as year’s past, mostly because they prefer playing four-out, especially with Kispert on the floor. The truest form of “Continuity Ball Screen” includes two bigs. But they still pull it out of the bag and run it when they are in a lull and need the get the offense moving a little bit.

What is more likely this season is continuity in their actions, with off-ball motion to complement what they are doing. Ball reversals can include passes or DHOs that lead into the next ball screen. If there’s a ball screen happening on the left, and there’s two players on the right, they will interchange, and often cut on the baseline. The ball handler is reading how the defense is covering the screen: How his defender is getting through it, how the big’s defender is covering (hedge, blitz, switch, drop, etc), and who is tagging the roller on the play.

Depending on how defenses play, the ball handler will make a decision: Hit the roller, drive it himself, pull up from three, hit the baseline cutter, throwback to the player lifting, or skip it across. Having multiple players who can dissect a defense in a split second and often make the correct decision is why this team is so successful. Jalen Suggs is explosive, but he’s also incredibly smart and has tremendous vision. Mark Few has called Andrew Nembhard a surgeon in ball screens, as he often called Josh Perkins. The difference is that Nembhard looks to attack a little more than Perkins and has that deadly mid-range jumper that Perkins never showed consistently. Joel Ayayi may not be as explosive, but he is unbelievably calm and patient with ball.

Let’s go through all these options one by one. First is the true pick-and-roll. The most likely time to hit the roller is on an open-side ball screen (first minute of video), in which the roller is rolling to a completely vacated side of the court, minimizing the chance of anyone being able to tag him. Of course, that’s not the only time to hit the roller (second minute). Because of all the off-ball movement (lifts, baseline cuts, interchanges), sometimes the defense doesn’t recognize who the tagger should even be. That, combined with an overall patience, creates some beautiful basketball.

Truly, the top option in a pick-and-roll is to drive and score the ball yourself. The beautiful thing about Gonzaga is that they don’t have selfish guards who try and score every single play. They make the correct basketball play more times than not, including Drew Timme. He uses himself as an attacker during his ball reversals. If the DHO is denied or he sees his defender cheating, anticipating an incoming ball screen, he can fake the DHO and drive to the rim himself. Andrew Nembhard is also one of the top mid-range shooters in the country coming off ball screens. He’s shooting 45.3% on two-point jumpers this season, the best mark on the team (min. 15 attempts).

Another way they score when attacking the rim is with duck-ins. This has been a staple of Gonzaga big men for years and years. When Gonzaga does play their two-big lineup with Watson and Timme, you’ll see this all the time. The opposite big will see a ball screen taking place up top, and they will “duck in” the middle of the paint and seal off their own defender, creating a wide open driving lane for the guard. It’s essentially a legal moving screen because it’s disguised as a post-up. You’ll also see it in transition at times, too.

This is certainly not Mark Few’s most prolific three-point shooting team. Kispert was the only player averaging more than one make per game in the regular season. But Suggs, Ayayi, and Nembhard are all more than capable of hitting open threes when defenders go under in ball screen coverage or are very slow on switches. Instead of trying to attack, they all have the green light to pull up and shoot the open three.

Now we move to the off-ball movement portion of ball screens, or as some might call it: The Joel Ayayi section. Sean Farnham called Ayayi the best off-ball cutter in the country. No doubt, his IQ and instincts are elite level. But some of his cutting is built into Gonzaga’s reads. He just happens to excel at it, and is in that position more than anyone else. However, every guard has had success on basket cuts this season. As I mentioned earlier, baseline cuts are a staple of Gonzaga’s ball screens. Some come off weak side exchanges where the defense loses vision. Some come when the baseline defender is tagging a roller. Some come just with vision and instincts alone. If a ball handler is dribbling at you off a ball screen, and you’re alone in the corner, you’re cutting to the basket.

The other part of ball-off movement is perimeter players “lifting” or “shaking”. If there’s a ball screen coming from the left wing, going right, the player in the left corner will elevate himself to the wing in order to receive a throwback pass. Typically this pass happens when that corner defender is the one tagging the roller. You can do a multitude of things when receiving this pass. If you catch it on the run, you can drive middle or hit a pull-up jumper. If the defender is way behind, you’ll get an open three. If the defender closes out well, you’re in perfect position for a post entry pass to a big man who should have deep position. At that point, you let Timme go to work and relocate for a kick out.

This is the least likely option, and usually only happens when you reject the screen, something that Gonzaga doesn’t do a ton of. Sometimes when the opposite corner defender tags the roller, instead of cutting to the baseline, a player will receive a skip pass for an open three or post entry. It’s rare, but it’s definitely part of their reads, and it takes an advanced level of vision.

After timeouts and dead balls, they run plenty of set plays, and Mark Few does have an expansive playbook. All their sets are about creating advantages against the defense. The principles you just watched all carry over to their sets, which basically all end up in some type of ball screen. The entire offense is just reading and reacting.

The coaches have mentioned before that they’ll have a few sets picked out before the game that they think can have a stronger impact based on how they believe defenses will cover certain actions. I’ll go through their most popular ones and explain what the progression is and why it’s successful.

We’ll start with the ones they run most often. First is their bunch DHO clear out. The point guard will give a DHO to the wing, who comes running off into a ball screen. The point guard who gives up the ball clears out to the opposite corner. Corey Kispert is in the middle of that action setting two dummy screens. The reason this play is successful is because there’s four defenders in a bunch, who all have to communicate and figure out what to do. The original point guard’s defender should be the one tagging the roller, but he is too occupied with the clear out and rarely recognizes it. The roller is open a ton in this action. If he’s not, it’s because Kispert’s defender tagged him, and that’s where Kispert comes in. Similar to what I mentioned earlier, that throwback pass to him becomes either an open three or a post entry.

The next set is called Blazer. It’s a version of “pitch chin” that Loyola Chicago ran a lot of in their 2018 Final Four run. It starts with a pass to the wing, followed by an immediate pitch back to the point guard. That wing receives a back screen from the post and then the post goes into a middle ball screen with the guard. The reason this play is successful is because of that back screen. The big’s defender has to help on that screen and it puts him at least one step behind in ball screen coverage, allowing driving lanes and open rolls in the middle of the floor. The spacing of this play is high level.

They also have a slight counter to this action. Instead of running a middle ball screen, they will run a step-up ball screen and work the baseline instead. They ran this a lot against BYU in Provo and a couple times in the WCC Title game. The next progression is actually a re-screen for Kispert, but they’ve yet to connect on that.

They also have a couple different UCLA actions. UCLA cuts are back screens occurring at the top of the lane line. One of their favorite things to do after free throws is their UCLA stuff. The first one is a simple UCLA cut into a ball screen. Again, watch the baseline cuts and throwbacks when they get into that ball screen. As I’ve said before, many of these sets are just entries to get into ball screens, and they read and react from there.

The other UCLA action is to get a two-man game going, usually Kispert and Timme. The set-up is basically the same. It’s a UCLA cut and a step-out to receive a pass. Instead of receiving a ball screen, the big sets a down screen for Kispert, and they work off of each other from there.

In basketball circles, they have something called “America’s Play.” That would be screen-the-screener action. If you get lucky, the original action doesn’t get defended well and you get an open shot or drive. Otherwise, it’s yet another way to lead into a high ball screen, and they just read the defense from there.

This next one is probably my favorite set from conference play because it looks so good when it works. It starts in a diamond formation. The point guard passes to the three-man overload side and receives a back screen to the completely vacated area. If it’s not there, they go into a ball screen attacking a triple gap, with a ton of room to operate. Defenses either give up a wide open back screen layup, or their ball screen coverage is a full step behind.

Floppy actions are incredibly popular in the NBA. There are many variations, but it’s generally pin-down screens for a shooter to get an open look. Often times, the shooter has screening options on both the left and right side. Gonzaga uses floppy actions for Kispert to get him and Timme into two-man game together, and they have played brilliantly off of each other all year.

A “zipper” entry in basketball is when a player comes straight up the lane line to initiate whatever the next action is. Gonzaga likes to runner zipper ball screens once in awhile, though not much down the stretch of the season. Again, it’s just another way for defenses to be a step behind when defending a screen.

Gonzaga has a ton of European influence in what they do. European basketball is incredibly ball screen and movement heavy, as opposed to a lot of isolation and three-point reliant basketball that the NBA has turned to. The Spain ball screen has been a staple in America now for years, and Gonzaga is no exception. It’s a very simple concept: Give a back screen to the ball screener. I sound like a broken record, but you’ll notice this is just another type of ball screen entry that incorporates their principles. You’ll see baseline cuts and throwbacks in every single set they run.

This is a lot less common than their other stuff, but they have a couple different Iverson sets in their playbook. Iverson cuts, made famous by Allen Iverson (duh), are guards making cuts off of elbow screens. Gonzaga runs two different sets off of Iverson entries. The first is a double ball screen, where the first is a slip, and the second is a roll. They ran this the very first play against Virginia, and ended up killing them with slips the entire game. Their second Iverson set is a flare screen followed by a down screen.

This play may just look like chaos to the naked eye because of how much movement there is, and in a way, that is the point. You can call it “wheel” or “shallow cut ball screen” or you can make up a random name for it. Do whatever you want! Either way, it involves a shallow cut from the original ball handler and it involves Kispert clearing out to the opposite corner. With this much movement, it’s very difficult for the defense to figure out who is tagging rollers, and like the rest of Gonzaga’s offense, it allows for easy rolls to the basket or throwbacks for deep post-ups. I think you might understand why they’re so successful in the paint at this point.

The ghost screen is becoming more and more popular in basketball. It’s very similar to a slip, except it’s usually a guard slipping upwards or sideways on the perimeter instead of to the basket. They run this pretty much exclusively with Kispert, and it’s their go-to action in the final seconds of a shot clock or game clock. Kispert sets enough ball screens that defenses believe he’s going to set another one, but instead he slips out of it. Either he’s wide open for a shot or drive, or the ball handler is open for a drive because the defense is a step behind.

Last, but not least, is what Gonzaga started the season with: Backdoor specials! There may be nothing sexier in basketball than a drawn-up backdoor play after a timeout. The most successful ones include dummy action on one side that lulls the defense to sleep on the other side, enough for a backdoor cut when the attention turns to them. Gonzaga has shown a couple different ones this season, but really hasn’t run them since the opening couple weeks of the year. Perhaps they will pop back up in the NCAA Tournament.

There’s plenty of stuff that I missed over the course of 26 games. Gonzaga runs a lot of really good baseline out-of-bounds plays, for example. Their zone offense is also really smart. I realized as I was doing this that I didn’t have enough devoted to off-ball movement during Timme post-ups. You can get a little glimpse of it during all the stuff you just watched, but someone can make an entire video breaking down players cutting and relocating when Timme touches the ball. His footwork also deserves its own instructional video for young players. They also have a double pin down action in secondary transition that they run sometimes along with a few other sets that weren’t as popular.

For the most part, though, what you just watched are all the things that make Gonzaga who they are: The undefeated, number one overall seed with the best offense in the nation, and the favorite to win their first National Championship.

They are nearly impossible to game plan for because they have everything. They have a dominant forward, but you can’t double him because you have a knockdown shooter in Corey Kispert, a capable shooter in Jalen Suggs, and elite cutters in Joel Ayayi and Andrew Nembhard. Suggs can get to the rim whenever he chooses in transition and in ball screens. Nembhard is a surgeon with the best mid-range game we’ve seen in awhile. Aaron Cook is their fourth point guard and has been a steadying influence and energizer bunny in several games this year. Anton Watson rarely makes mistakes and shoots 70 percent.

The 2017 and 2019 teams did not have the explosiveness on the perimeter that this team has. They dominated with their forwards, but they did not have multiple perimeter drivers with this kind of size who could take over a game when needed. Guard play has determined National Champions for seemingly forever, and this Bulldog team has by far the best guard play in program history. That is why this iteration of Gonzaga has the best chance of raising their first banner.